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PROJECTION OF ACTIONS, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

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
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MUNGOOSE

31 August 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From:

Brig. Gen. Lansdale,

Subject:

Phase II, Operation Mongoose

Pursuant to your instructions, transmitted herewith is a proposed projection of actions to be undertaken as Phase II, Operation Mongoose. This projection incorporates the suggestions of the operations team designated by the major departments and agencies charged with Mongoose planning and implementation.

The format employed is responsive to the 16 August 1962 guidelines for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, and to your comments at recent meetings. The projection is divided into each objective contained in the 16 August guidelines, and then lists proposed actions to attain that objective. The guideline objectives have been given short titles as follows:

- A. Discredit and isolate the regime
- B. Harass the economy
- C. Intensify intelligence collection
- D. Split regime leadership and relations with Bloc
- E. Assist Cuban exile groups and Latin American governments to take actions
- F. Be prepared to exploit a revolt

In preparing this projection of actions for Phase II, Operation Mongoose, an effort was made to restrict proposals to the "B plus" frame of reference provided and to assume that a broader frame of programming under the NSAM would supplement Mongoose by separate planning.

"Special Handling" number copies to:

Special Group (Series A)

- 1. General Taylor
- 2. Mr. Johnson
- 3. Mr. Gilpatric
- Added (Series B)
- 1. Mr. Bundy,
- 2. Mr. Rusk

- 4. Mr. McCone
- 5. Mr. Kennedy
- 6. General Lemnitzer
- 3. Mr. McNamara
- 4. Mr. Murrow

Operational Representatives (Series B)

- 5. Mr. Hurwitch (State)
- 6. General Johnson (Defense)
- 7. Mr. Harvey (CIA)

8. Mr. Wilson (USIA)

9-15. Chief of Operations

TOP SECRET NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

PHASE II

(1 August 1962 until

OBJECTIVE A DISCREDIT AND ISOLATE THE REGIME

ACTIVITY

PURPOSE

- sultative Committee (SCCS), to establish Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the OAS Special Con controls over the travel of their nationals to Cuba. - (State, with CIA support)
- Encourage Latin American nations, bilaterally and through the SCCS, to limit or prohibit entry of Cuban propaganda. (State, with CIA and USIA support)
- Provide intelligence of arms smuggling (CIA, State, Defense) from Cuba to other Hemisphere nations
- As opportune, initiate action or support another nation's initiative in the OAS with gime in Cuba. (State, with CIA support) respect to countering the Communist re-

facilitate the collection of intelligence on persons travelling. American nationals to Cuba and to To diminish travel by Latin

propaganda into Latin America. To diminish the influx of Cuban

of Cuban subversion in the Hemis-To obtain and exploit hard evidence phere

pheric context of the Cuban problem. To maintain the multilateral hemis-

CONSIDERATIONS

tutional provisions regarding freedom of bars against admitting foreign publications. Many Latin American countries have legal

Most Latin American nations have consti

encourage Latins to develop alerting sys-Commanders requested to develop and tems, to include anti-infiltration training

the Cuban issue may be surfaced. As an supported and exploited. example of this activity, the current Deep division within the Hemisphere over Dominican initiative in the OAS should be

REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC

COPY of 6 COPIES SERIES A

PURPOSE

- Continue the program of excluding Cuba from Hemisphere organizations (State, with CIA support
- Stimulate manifestations critical of the groups. (State, with CIA and USIA and student and other significant impact American political, labor, religious, Castro/Communist regime by Latin
- Cuban diplomats, officials, and delegates Encourage and exploit the defection of abroad. (CIA)
- of the nature of the Castro/Communist Keep friendly nations fully informed regime and of U.S. policy with respect to it. (State, with CIA and USIA support)

action

To provide for coordinated

Cuba. To strengthen the isolation of

imitated. has rejected Cuba as a model to be To demonstrate that Latin America


revelations by Cuban "insiders." To make utmost political use of

CONSIDERATIONS

health, should be examined to determine U.S. national interest Possible exceptions, such as in public

should stem naturally out of Cuban events as they happen. "Events" could include on what is happening to students, workers To be productive, such demonstrations etc. inside Cuba. Cuban refugee publication of substantive facts

if they cannot be recruited in place, then exploiting the defection fully for propaganda be more valuable, it is not always so, and Although keeping defectors "in place" can is important. Note items 45 and 46



Psychological

will to resist within Cuba. (USIA, with State support developing and maintaining the official and non-official spokesmen which of statements by U.S. and other free world Beamed to Cuba, initiate a planned series and CIA support)

10. Continue Voice of America short-wave

broadcasts to Cuba. (USIA)

within Cuba. To maintain resistance morale

people. communication with the Cuban To maintain regular, overt


unfavorable comment from Cuban refugee groups should be expected, demanding a harder line. Moderation must be the keynote. Some

will be increased, to maintain a subjective Carefully documented programs of the daily specifically programmed for Cuba broadcasting in Spanish, with three hours the Western Hemisphere. Communist regime elsewhere, particularly will be given to repudiations of the Castro/ basis for Cuban disaffection. Emphasisfailures of the Castro/Communist system The activity is based on nine hours of daily

wave broadcasts. Renewed efforts will be taries on anti-Castro themes will be included groups. "Soap operas" and special commen-Broadcasters Association members and other made to enlist support from Inter-American This activity now includes both VOA short-

11. Continue U.S. broadcasting to the Western Hemisphere. (USIA)

phere awake to the Cuban situation To keep the people of the Hemis



SPECIAL HANDENG SECRET-NOFORM

PURPOSE

ACTIVITY

Produce propaganda cartoon books. (USIA):

Latin America. youth, labor, and other groups in image of Castro/Communism among To build and reinforce a negative

Produce photo-novels carrying the propaganda story. (USIA)

Same as 12 above

Supply TV outlets in Latin America with materials. (USIA).

> on key leader audiences Same as 12 above, plus impact

Produce short films for commercial outlets and impact groups in Latin America. (USIA).

Same as 12 above.

Produce propaganda exhibits ("before" and "after") for public and organizational display. (USIA)

Same as 12 above.

CONSIDERATIONS


will determine if additional funds will have to be sought. Congressional action on USIA's FY 63 budget Soviet technicians, guerrillas, etc). Final reform problems, prisoner treatment, Themes can be updated quickly (agrarian

ment. These novels would complement the An anti-Castro pilot model is under develop cartoon books (in 12 above), particularly in urban working groups


except Santiago and Valparaiso, Chile, and covers all major cities in Latin America news clips, a series of one-minute puppet In addition to supplying documentaries and shorts will be tried. Commercial TV now La Paz, Bolivia

Government censorship of all films in Latin America presents a potential problem.

slats on a venetian blind exhibit, changing with his actions. An electric motor turns the The first one contrasts Castro's promises Three such exhibits are now being developed



- 18. Special propaganda exploitation of U.S. information about the agricultural labor, and public health situation in Cuba. (State, with CIA and USIA support).
- 9 Expand the delivery of propaganda material into Cuba via the open mails legal travellers, and controlled couriers. (CIA).
- 20. Develop specific proposal for use of balloons to deliver propaganda. (CIA)
- 21. Direct propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba. (CIA)



Same as 12 above, plus impact on intellectuals and other opinion leaders.

To make full use of the factual basis for propaganda actions exposing true conditions inside Cuba.

To disaffect the Cuban people and to help maintain the will to resist.

To provide a means of distributing propaganda inside Cuba.

To make them disaffected with their role in Cuba.

OP SEGREL-MOFORN

CONSIDERATIONS

Volume will depend in part on results of USIA's request for supplemental funds for the Latin American book program, now pending before Congress. Several new books are now in the pipeline.

Current research on Cuba by US departments and agencies, outside Mongoose, should be maintained and then be passed into Mongoose channels for use in the project This includes Department of Agriculture, Department of Labor, and the Public Health Service.

The "Gusano Libre" theme deserves much wider exploitation, since this is a theme created by resistance within Cuba itself.

This distribution technique must appear as a genuine Cuban refugee project. It must consider risks of injuring population or being exploited along that line by the Castro/Communist regime to the detriment of Mongoose objectives.

22. "Voice of Free Cuba" broadcasts from submarine. (CIA, with Defense support).

To have a "voice" for resistance inside Cuba.

The initial broadcasts indicated that this can be made into an effective medium, at small risk. In strengthening the effectiveness, full use should be made of talents in the Cuban refugee community. CIA will coordinate this activity closely with State and USIA.

 Continue "Radio Americas" broadcasts from Swan Island as appropriate. (CIA).

Make available to the International Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban exportation/importation of narcotics. (State).

24.

To provide an irritant to the Castro/Communist regime.

To create increased awareness


in Latin America of Cuban subversive activities.

Documented evidence available or obtainable should be fully exploited for impact upon hemisphere and world opinion.

This activity will be undertaken only on a spot basis, coordinated with U.S. objectives in the specific country.

Arrange for caches of limited Soviete
Czech arms to be "discovered" in
selected Latin American countries,
ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba. (CLA)

To sow and increase distrust in Latin America of the Castro/Communist regime.



OBJECTIVE B: HARASS THE ECONOMY

ACTIVITY

26. Encourage the Cuban people, as appro priate, to engage in minor acts of sabotage. (CIA).

PURPOSE

cations, power, and transport raw materials; to encourage the limited way. spirit of resistance, even in a facilities; to reduce availability of

To cause breakdowns of commun



27.

Conduct selected major sabotage operations against key Cuban indus-

tries and public utilities, with

portation, communication, power

priority attention being given to trans

plants, and utilities. (CIA)



CONSIDERATIONS

actions as excessive use of electricity or material spoilage, and crop burning. puncturing tires, contaminating gas tanks), immobilizing vehicles (stealing parts, short-circuiting of telephone equipment, 'Minor acts of sabotage" include such

to the Cuban people; however, unless a used, it is probable that this activity will method of mass distribution of leaflets is attributable, will be used to get the message All forms of media, non-US government be minor and spotty.

can be developed with the necessary access of the operation, or by internal assets if such operation and extiltrated at the completion sabotage teams infiltrated especially for the will be conducted either by especially to the target. The following are currently trained, carefully selected commando/ Depending upon circumstances, the sabotage selected targets:

27. (continued)

CONSIDERATIONS

Matahambre Mine-Santa Lucia

Texaco Refinery-Santiago

Shell/Esso Refinery-Habana

Regla Steam Electric Plant-Habana

Matanzas Steam Electric Plant-Matanzas

Moa Bay Nickel Plant

11

Toa bay Mickel Plant

Paper Mill - Cardenas

Micro Wave Towers

Each operation entails risk, not only physical risk for the saboteurs, but also risk of attribution to the U.S. in case of capture. Care will be taken to give these actions the appearance of being done by internal resistance groups, and in isolating team members from press sources upon return. The U.S. handling of information, in case of contingency, will be established by CIA in coordination with USIA and State.

1.3 at



28 Sabotage Cuban assets outside Cuba as targets of opportunity, provided this does not unduly affect food and medical supplies, or the Cuban people as such. (CIA).

Inspire labor groups outside Cuba to obstruct free world trade with Cuba (CIA and State).

 Discourage free world trade with Cuba. (State, supported by CIA).

31. Encourage the OAS Special Committee to recommend further trade measures against Cuba by Latin American countries. (State).



To cripple Cuban commerce and place strain upon regime security forces.

To force the use of more Bloc resources, including shipping.

To force the use of more Bloc resources, to deny Cuba hard currency earnings, and to hasten deterioration of Cuba's essentially free world equipped industrial plant.

To provide a basis for renewed pressures upon NATO to recommend trade controls to NATO members.



CONSIDERATIONS

Things, not people, are the targets. This activity requires a capability to act quickly on spot intelligence. Targets are seen mostl as shipments of products into or from Cuba. Sabotage would be to cause undue delay of shipment, using additives to spoil a commodity, fire or water damage, etc. A recent example was reported, post-action, on a shipment to the USSR.


This is an activity mostly in third countries

Most free world trading nations are opposed to imposing necessary trade controls. Importers might be dissuaded from using Cuba as a source of supply, such as the example of Japan recently. Preclusive buying and other forms of economic warfare deserve hard consideration.

OAS Special Committee action should be geared to SCCS reports or other developments in the Hemisphere which might provide a good basis for Special Committee action.



32. Reduce production of export agricovert means. (CIA). cultural commodities in Cuba, by



program. to the regime's domestic economic To cripple Cuban commerce vital

CONSIDERATIONS

would include tobacco, tropicals, and coffee. Activities machinery, etc. shipping containers, sabotage of sugar mill destruction of bags, cartons, and other pering of harvests by work slow-downs, The main export commodities are sugar,

are recognized. However, a priority alert The operational difficulties in this activity for this is warranted.

1.360/4

and defense capability.

To sabotage Cuba's transportation

Spot, recruit, and train legally estab supported by State and Defense). Government Posts abroad. (CIA, blished Cubans in Cuba or in Cuban

PURPOSE

particular emphasis on the following: intelligence coverage of Cuba with this objective is to provide maximum The purpose of all activities under

- Capabilities and intentions of the Castro Government
- Soviet activities in Cuba military personnel, units, locations, capabilities, et al cluding details of Soviet
- Activities of Cuban G-2
- Military and militia order of battle and morale.
- State of resistance including population. the tone and temper of the
- Focus of power and/or stress and strain among the "Power Centers" in the Cuban Govern
- activities in the hemisphere Evidence of Cuban subversive

CONSIDERATIONS

be done inside Cuba either by established trained while visiting outside Cuba; however, agents or by agents infiltrated especially for when necessary recruitment and training will When possible they will be recruited and

organization is determined on a case by or jointly with a third country intelligence case basis. Whether this is done unilaterally

specifically by CIA; in other cases the In some cases the travel as generated travels can be utilized to meet intelligence

requirements.

34. (continued)

403d 1.3 a.H

operational intelligence, and recited intelligence objectives, to meeting basic intelligence recruitment leads as well as agent In addition to meeting the above quirements above, timely operacurrent operations. tional intelligence is vital to CIA material result from the Opa-locka perations. In addition

ω 5 Spot, recruit, and train third country nationals resident in Cuba. (CIA, supported by State and Defense).


See 34 above.

See 34 above.

36. Spot, recruit and train legal travellers and Defense). who have potential access to significant information. (CIA, supported by State

See 34 above.

37 . Continue Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa-locka, Florida. (CIA, with Defense, USIA, and other support).




Follow up debriefing of selected refugees the most significant source of intelligence the selective debriefing of refugees provide after departure from Opa-locak will The continuation of the refugee flow and

38 illor Madrid

See 34 above.

39 Maintain PAA service between the U.S. and Cuba. (State, with CIA support).



See 34 above.

skilled manpower from Cuba.

to continue the exodus of and documentation, a

provide intelligence and agent

41. Continue monitoring overt Cuban broadcasts. (CIA).

42 pand their intelligence coverage of rd country intelligence services assist, and/or support friendly intelligence requirements.

> ganda material. To obtain intelligence and propa-

See 34 above.

CONSIDERATIONS


be more limited in size and selective Madrid Debriefing Center will conti s primarily an NSA problem but (outinue to assist as practicable nue to local conditions and problems. loice of refugees than Opa-locka

tinue this activity. PAA requires financial assistance to con-

coverage of the internal micro-wave would become a major budget and pers enized that significant increa

This is done on a regular basis by FBIS.






44. Establish program of periodic reports from U.S. Embassies in Hemisphere analyzing the effects of existence of the target area regime on host country. (State).


TOP SEGRET-NOFURAN SPECIAL HANDLING PURPOSE

See 34 above.


To maintain a reasonably current estimate of the impact of the target area regime on the Hemisphere.



CONSIDERATIONS



Top



Collect personality information on key their influences. (CIA and others). their attitudes, their associates, and Cuban individuals, their personalities

PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

between the individuals. individuals and to identify frictions To identify channels to key

the channel is effectively established or exploitation of the channel or of any splits the split is detected in the regime will be determined in the work plus the "breaks of the game." The light of existing circumstances at the time developed depends on basic professional The degree to which these channels can be This is a long term continuing program

to selected key individual and "power Develop channels of communication centers! of the regime. (CIA)

individuals.

To permit exploitation of the key


Conduct psychological and political

action. (CIA and State).

To attain the objective.

Activity will include:


By public and private comment, to principally among the militia, the labor, youth and students, farmers government bureaucracy, by organized in the leadership and ranks of the supporters of the Castro regime, stimulate distrust and disaffection



47. (continued)


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CONSIDERATIONS



and Bloc personnel to exacerbate Provoke incidents between Cubans tensions.

<u>٥</u>



the propaganda and political activities of all Cuban exile groups and individuals offering useful impact inside Cuba and upon world opinion. (CIA, with State and USIA support).

PURPOSE

Will of the Cuban people to resist Castro/Communist rule. To provide an articulate, meaningful symbol and voice of free Cuba to informand influence public and official opinion outside Cuba.


CONSIDERATIONS

and lead in this effort, with U.S. assisting of propaganda that reports on the true state Communist dictatorship. Cubans speaking of Cuba's enslavement and misery under countries and Spain as well as those in the possible. Groups such as a "Free Cubar for Cuba are the most credible witnesses Major popular impact groups can be most and advising. effective in production and dissemination exiles should consider exiles in hemisphere of Cuba." This program of support for those committing "crimes against the people openly prepare for eventual punishment of USA. As possible, the exiles should manage Judicial Committee" could publicize and

Provide covert support to the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC). (CIA).

To provide a degree of cohesion within the exile community and to provide a cover and funding mechanism for the invasion survivors and prisoners. In addition some funding of constituent exile groups is handled thru CRC. To support and guide CRC propaganda activities directed at Latin America and Cuba itself.


In spite of its many inadequacies, the CRC performs a variety of useful functions which if it were to be disbanded, would have to be handled by possibly less efficient means.



50 Encourage and support other governprograms for Cuba along lines of our own effort. (State, CIA). ments in the hemisphere to undertake

timing, upon a separate-butgram with common goals and countries instead of placing focus attention and effort toward collective basis. To direct mainly on the U.S. initiative of Latin American To develop a multi-national pro-

> and coordination is involved, with recognition third nation efforts. that the U.S. is helping not employing the but not prohibitive criteria for consultation initiative in other national leaders. Reasonable and covert U.S. actions, to stir and support This will require the highest order of overt



PURPOSE

CONSIDERATIONS

These plans are well advanced

Continue to develop and refine contingency plans. (Defense)

To assure maximum readiness from the standpoint of military planning for military intervention if directed

52. Continue planning with Defense and the plans for Cuba. (State, CIA and USIA). cipation of others in military contingency various sub-commanders for the parti-

> tingency plans. the event of execution of military con To provide support to the military in

53 Establish and maintain in being the necessary communication and crypto cluding various sub-commands. (CIA) links between CIA and Defense, in-


> tingency plans. bility to support the military con-To provide the communication capa

> > process of being established. These links have been or are in the

Develop post-Castro concepts, leaders, of others). and political groups. (State, with support

Castro resistance elements and to Communism. successful overthrow of Castro, Castro government in the event of a facilitate the transition of a post To provide a focal point for anti-

> substantial change due to circumstances tinuing study and which may be subject to which exist at the time This is a matter which will require con-



PURPOSE

To have available in Cuba a re-


Cache arms, ammunition, and other potential resistance areas. (CIA) to known resistance elements and in supplies in areas of Cuba accessible

sistance cells in the major cities and Recruit, train, and supply small rein other selected areas of Cuba (CIA)

sources and to be available in the

event of an uprising.

serve of arms and ammunition. To provide controlled intelligence



CONSIDERATIONS

patrolling will be such that in the near future be used in lieu of surface craft considered likely that Cuban maritime infiltration/exfiltration operations. L if the job is to be done, submarines must This will require extensive maritime

security controls have demonstrated the or if its continued presence jeopardises the will be withdrawn if it is seriously endangered filtrees can become "legalized." Therefore country for an indefinite period. marines or aircraft as a means of infiltration capabilities may require the utilization of sub support infiltrees. Increased Cuban defensive the willingness of the Cuban population to stances; including Cuban security controls and possible in the light of existing circum developed to the extent that proves feasible "legal" residents. The program will be completion of training, the infiltrated team intelligence and/or resistance cells. recruit and train small "legal" compartmented two to five man teams will be infiltrated to any method yet been devised by which ias individuals or "Black Teams" in the large difficulty of infiltrating and monitoring Experience and continually tightening and/or exfiltration in lieu of surface marimorale and motivation of agent material and Upon